Posts

A little over three years ago, while researching malware execution sandboxes, I found a stealth way to detect FireEye’s Malware Analysis System (MAS). In this blog post I will release the details.

I deployed three web honeypots, one in Singapore, another in Australia and another one in France. I then leveraged IVRE and Suricata to investigate the visitors, and respective traffic they generated.

In a previous article, I explained how to get root on the embedded Linux part of the Technicolor 7210 router by leveraging a remote code execution (RCE). This article on the other hand, will explain how one can leverage a “frontdoor” to gain the same level of access.

In this article I will explain how to reverse the firmware of the embedded Linux part of the Technicolor (TC) 7210 router by leveraging the usual tools of the trade.

(...) simply insisted we prove that the Queen didn’t do it—that is, demanding a refutation of wild speculation to prove fact, rather than seeking out the evidence first. This proof-by-negation is akin to fastidiously believing in the tooth fairy simply because no one has seen proof that the tooth fairy doesn’t exist. That is noxious thinking—and, (...), it’s exactly the kind of aggressive, close-minded speculation that fuels fake news, Trumpian rhetoric, and political divisions.

This post isn’t about politics, it’s about how easy it is to fall in the fallacy of proving something didn’t happen by negating it. It’s about how tiresome it can be to always fact check, proving through facts what is reality and what is fiction. It’s about avoiding a dark universe of alternative realities that enclose you in an existence of self-feeding bigotry. Of believing your feelings are facts, are reality.

Image via StockSnap @ Pixabay

The Technicolor 7210 home router is a powerful little device. It provides 1Gbps Ethernet, dual-band wireless for speeds ranging from 300Mbps to 1300Mbps, and Network Attached Storage (NAS) for file sharing and media streaming.

After reading harmj0y blog post about “Roasting AS-REPs”, I have decided to update the Dump-User.ps1 script in order for it to report on users that don’t have Kerberos pre-authentication enabled. Running the updated version against a “in the wild” target yielded interesting results to say the least.

In the previous part of this multi-part article, I explained how I reversed engineered one of the binaries of the Cisco AnyConnect (CAC) Secure Mobility Client. This allowed me to understand the header format of the network packets used in the Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanism. In this part, I will focus on doing a more dynamic analysis in order to understand what goes in the packet body.

The Cisco AnyConnect (CAC) Secure Mobility Client doesn’t have the brightest security track record. CVE-2015-4211 and CVE-2015-6305 are only two out of the fourteen CVEs that have been assigned to it just in 2015. This spiked my curiosity and prompted me to confirm if Cisco had properly fixed the underlying issue of these vulnerabilities.

Ever wondered how to decrypt HPQPswd encrypted passwords? So did I when, for the first time, I came across a strange file called password.bin with a magic value of _HPPW12_.